Explanation
Password manager security
Why the password manager encrypts in your browser, why it has its own password, what the post-quantum encryption and signatures are for, and the limit that comes with a web page.
The password manager, under Passwords in the account menu, holds the most sensitive things people keep: passwords, card numbers, recovery codes, keys. It is built so that the Sovrain server stores them without being able to read them. This page explains how that works, what it protects against, and where its protection ends.
Encryption happens in your browser
Everything you put in the password manager is encrypted in your browser before it is sent, and decrypted in your browser after it comes back. The server receives and stores only ciphertext: entries, attachments and their history. This is usually called end-to-end encryption.
The server still sees some things, because it needs them to do its job: who owns which entry, whom it is shared with and at what level, how large entries and attachments are, and when they were changed. It does not see names, addresses, passwords, notes or file contents.
The point of this design is that a copy of the server’s data is useless without your keys. A stolen database, a leaked backup, an export file in the wrong hands, or a curious administrator with access to the server all end up with ciphertext. That includes the admins of your organization: they can reset your sign-in, but they cannot open your password manager, and nobody at Sovrain can read it from the stored data either.
Why it has its own password
When you set up the password manager, you are asked for a vault password that is different from your sign-in password. It is easy to see this as one password too many, but it is what makes the encryption meaningful. Nothing checks that the two differ; if you reuse your sign-in password, the protection described below is gone.
Your sign-in password is sent to Sovrain every time you sign in, because that is how Sovrain checks it. A key derived from it would therefore be a key the server could, in principle, compute. The vault password never leaves your browser. The browser turns it into a key with Argon2id, a function designed to make each guess cost a lot of memory and time, so that someone holding the ciphertext cannot simply try billions of candidates. The browser also asks for at least 14 characters and checks the password against known breached passwords, in a way that never sends the password itself (see Breach checks).
The flip side of a password the server never sees is that the server cannot reset it. That is why setup gives you a recovery key and asks you to save it. If you lose both the vault password and the recovery key, and no remembered browser or vault passkey still opens the vault, your entries cannot be recovered by anyone. Using the recovery key in the password manager sends you an email, if your address is verified, so that a recovery key in someone else’s hands is noticed when it is used there. Someone who also holds a copy of the server’s data or an export can use it without that email. You can also unlock with a passkey, or let a browser remember the vault: the browser then keeps a key that scripts can use but cannot read out, which is convenient on your own computer and a reason to untick it on a shared one.
Sharing, and why the encryption is post-quantum
You can share an entry with a person or with a group, with permission to view, to edit, or to edit and share further. Sharing never sends your keys anywhere. Instead, your browser encrypts the entry’s key separately for each person who should be able to read it, using that person’s public key. For a group, that means each member of the group as Sovrain lists the group at that moment. People who join the group later receive their copy the next time someone who can edit the entry saves it, or someone who can share it uses Share with everyone who can read, provided that person trusts the new member’s key. People who leave cannot be made to forget what they have already read, so the entry is marked for a key change.
The encryption for each recipient uses X-Wing, a hybrid that combines a well-established elliptic-curve method, X25519, with ML-KEM-768, a newer method designed to resist quantum computers. Stored passwords stay valuable for a long time, and ciphertext copied today could be kept until such computers exist. A hybrid is safe as long as either of its two halves holds, so it adds protection against that future without betting everything on the newer method.
Entries and sharing decisions are also signed, with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 together; both signatures must verify. Signatures answer a different question from encryption: not “who can read this?” but “who wrote this, and has it been changed?” Your browser accepts a signature only from keys it trusts, so a server that altered an entry, or slipped in a version written by someone else, would be detected.
That leaves one gap: how does your browser know that Bob’s public key is really Bob’s, and not one the server swapped in? The password manager shows each person a fingerprint of their keys. Comparing fingerprints with Bob through some channel other than Sovrain, in person or over a call, and marking him as verified closes that gap. Your browser encrypts only for people it trusts: people you have verified, and people introduced to you by someone you verified (one step only, shown as introduced by that person). Trusting a person therefore also means trusting whom they verify. Anyone else in the share, including members of a shared group, gets no copy until you verify them, and the password manager tells you who was left out. Everyone who verifies you can see whom you have verified; that is how introductions work.
The limit: the code comes from the same server
End-to-end encryption in a web page has a limit that no amount of cryptography removes. The code that does the encryption is itself delivered to your browser by the Sovrain server each time you open the page. A server that has been taken over, or deliberately changed, could deliver modified code that sends your vault password or your decrypted entries somewhere else. You would have no practical way to notice.
So the password manager protects your data against stolen databases, leaked backups and exports, and against anyone who can read the server’s storage. It does not protect you against a Sovrain server that has been made to work against you while you use it. The setup screen says this too. This is the standard situation for every web application with end-to-end encryption, not something particular to Sovrain. Applications installed separately, such as browser extensions or desktop programs, narrow the gap because their code is distributed and updated on its own; Sovrain’s password manager is available only as a web page.
Whether that trade-off suits you depends on what you are protecting against. For most teams, the main risks are leaked copies of data and over-curious access, and this design addresses them well.
Related pages
- Set up the password manager
- Verify a colleague
- Share an entry or a folder
- Open the vault with the recovery key
- Rotate your vault keys
- Security model, for how the rest of Sovrain stores data