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Explanation

Two-step sign-in

Why Sovrain asks for a second step after the password, how the methods differ, how requirements and grace periods work, and why applications are told what happened.

A password alone proves only that someone knows the password. Passwords get reused, guessed and phished, and an identity provider is the one place where a stolen password opens every application at once. Two-step sign-in adds a second proof that is much harder to steal at the same time as the password: a code from a phone, or a key that signs only for Sovrain.

A second step, not a replacement

In Sovrain the second step always comes after the password. There is no passwordless sign-in: a passkey or a security key is never a way to skip the password, only a way to complete the second step.

This keeps one model for everyone. Every account has a password, every second step is added on top of it, and an admin can reason about one kind of sign-in. The cost is that people type a password even when they own a key that could, in other systems, sign them in on its own.

The methods and what they protect against

Sovrain offers four kinds of second step. They differ mostly in how they behave against phishing and in what happens when a device is lost.

Authenticator app. The app on a phone and Sovrain share a secret and both derive a six-digit code from it every 30 seconds. It works on any phone and needs no special hardware. Its weakness is that a code is just text: a convincing fake sign-in page can ask for the password and the code and pass both on to Sovrain within the same half-minute. Sovrain never accepts the same code twice, which stops a code from being reused later, but not from being relayed live.

Security key. A physical key, such as one you plug in or tap, holds a private key that never leaves it. During sign-in the browser asks the key to sign a challenge for the organization’s host name, and the key refuses any other host. A fake page on a look-alike address therefore gets nothing usable. This is the strongest method Sovrain offers. Its cost is the hardware, and the fact that a lost key is gone for good.

Passkey. A passkey works the same way as a security key, but lives in the device, the operating system or a password manager. Many passkeys are synced: the platform copies them to the person’s other devices through their cloud account. Syncing is convenient and makes loss less painful, but it also means the key exists in more places and is only as safe as that cloud account. Sovrain accepts synced passkeys and, in OpenID Connect, tells apps which kind was used (swk for a key that can be synced, hwk for one that cannot), so an app that cares can tell them apart. SAML applications get the same context class for every second step.

Backup codes. Ten one-time codes, generated as a set and meant to be printed or stored somewhere safe. Each works once. They exist for the day the phone or the key is not at hand, and Sovrain stores them only as slow hashes, so a copy of the database does not reveal them. Without them, a lost authenticator can leave a person dependent on an admin to get back in.

Because passkeys and security keys are bound to the host name, they stop working if the organization later moves to its own domain. Organizations and their addresses explains why.

Who has to use it

Your organization’s admins decide who must add a second step: nobody, chosen groups, admins and chosen groups, or everyone. A new organization requires it of nobody. An application can also require a second step of the people who sign in to it, whatever the organization has set.

A new requirement does not lock you out the next morning. You usually get a period to set it up, 7 days unless your admins chose otherwise, and until it ends Sovrain offers Skip for now at sign-in. A skip covers only that sign-in. An application that requires a second step offers no skip, because it has said it will not accept a password alone. How admins choose this is in Require two-step sign-in.

Why applications are told

When Sovrain signs someone in to an application, it also says how they signed in. In OpenID Connect this is the amr claim, for example ["pwd"] for a password alone or ["pwd","hwk","mfa"] for a password and a security key, plus an acr value that appears only when a second step was completed. In SAML it is the authentication context class of the assertion. The details are in Claims and attributes and SAML.

This matters because many applications have their own rules: the billing screen may want stronger sign-in than the wiki. An application can only enforce that if the identity provider tells it the truth. Some identity providers report only “password” even after a second step, which leaves applications unable to tell the two cases apart and pushes them to ask for a second step of their own. Sovrain reports what actually happened, and reports nothing stronger than that.

When an application asks for more

An application does not have to rely on the organization’s rules. It can ask for a second step in the sign-in request itself: with acr_values or the claims parameter in OpenID Connect, or with a requested authentication context in SAML. If you signed in to Sovrain with your password only, Sovrain then asks you to sign in again with your second step, or, if you have none yet, to set one up, and then continues to the application. Signing in again replaces your Sovrain session, which can sign you out of other applications tied to the old one; setting up a first method keeps the session. When the application renews its tokens later, Sovrain checks again that your session still meets what it requires.

This is usually called step-up. It keeps everyday use simple and asks for more only where it matters. Developers: Require two-step sign-in from your app.

When the second step is lost

A second step that cannot be lost would be a second step nobody can recover from. Sovrain’s answer has layers: backup codes first, then an admin who can reset a person’s two-step methods so they can set them up again. An organization can also allow resetting a lost second step by email, but this is off by default, because it makes access to the mailbox a substitute for the second step. Admins can remove or reset methods, but they can never add one on your behalf: you always set up your own. The steps are in Recover lost two-step sign-in.

Wrong codes are limited to 10 failures per hour per account, counted across sign-in, password resets and signing in as someone else. After 10 wrong attempts within an hour, the account’s second step is locked for the rest of that hour: even a correct code or key is refused. Anyone who knows the password can trigger this, which is the denial-of-service trade-off Security model describes for passwords, accepted here to stop guessing.